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Abstract 77 
Misleading claims about mass migration induced by climate change continue to surface in 78 
both academia and policy. This requires a new research agenda on ‘climate mobilities’ that 79 
moves beyond simplistic assumptions and more accurately advances knowledge of the nexus 80 
between human mobility and climate change.  81 
 82 
Main 83 
International migration and climate policy assume that anthropogenic climate change already 84 
is, and will increasingly be, a major driver of mass migration from the Global South to the 85 
Global North. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change explicitly 86 
specifies the need to avert, minimize and address climate displacement,1 while the United 87 
Nations Security Council warns of mass climate migration with the risk of aggravating 88 
conflicts.2 While the potential for climate change to disrupt livelihoods and threaten lives is 89 
real, these policies reinforce a false narrative that predicts large numbers of ‘climate 90 
refugees’. This self-referencing narrative within scientific literature and policy reports has the 91 
consequence of entrenching climate migration as a looming security crisis without an 92 
empirical scientific basis.3  93 
Rather than being challenged, this securitization narrative, presenting climate change 94 
and migration as a security risk, is actively being perpetuated by public funding schemes for 95 





In doing so these funding policies, as a matter of priority, justify keeping climate migrants in 97 
places of origin, so as to present no harm to populations in destination areas.4 Symptomatic of 98 
this securitization agenda was a recent EU Horizon 2020 funding call for research on climate 99 
change and migration that reflected political demands rather than research gaps to alleviate 100 
“migration pressures at the source”.5 Similarly, a Horizon 2020 research funding call from 101 
2015 used the example of climate migration to illustrate the “real threat”’ to European 102 
security of Third Country climate-driven crises.6    103 
The influence of this narrative is considerable, with ‘climate-induced migration’ now 104 
a common rationale for measures to strengthen and protect national and regional borders in 105 
the Global North. For example, the EU migration agenda aims to protect borders “with the 106 
intent to keep people in their places and minimize migration”.7 The US Department of 107 
Defence names intra- and inter-state migration associated with climate change as responsible 108 
for negative human security effects in destination countries.8 Similarly, Australia is pursuing 109 
a policy of territorial control, by either keeping borders closed or extending Australian law to 110 
‘off shore’ processing on Pacific island countries.9   111 
New international science funding schemes, such as the forthcoming call on Human 112 
Migration and Global Change by the internationally funded Belmont Forum and successor 113 
programmes to EU Horizon 2020, can help in rethinking climate change and migration, by 114 
offering scientists an opportunity to take a new look at what constitutes global mobility. If 115 
such opportunities are not taken, there is a danger that migration policy will continue to be 116 
based on weak scientific evidence that reinforces the self-perpetuating myth of climate 117 
change migration as a looming security crisis.   118 
A fresh approach is therefore needed, one that enables science to actively help shape 119 
public funding schemes for scientific research that well captures the complex, mobile and 120 





aim, we offer the following research agenda consisting of six priorities to help science policy 122 
to move beyond its securitized outlook.  123 
Six research priorities  124 
First, research and research funding must enable questioning of the assumption that climate 125 
change causes mass human migration, rather than simply reinforcing it. There is already 126 
significant evidence that migration is not solely driven by climate change. It is instead 127 
influenced by a mix of climatic, socio-economic, cultural, and political factors.10 Even when 128 
climate change has a role to play, it remains difficult to determine the extent of its influence. 129 
For instance, when people have to move in the event of a cyclone, it is not always clear to 130 
what extent the cyclone can be attributed to climate change.11 Moreover, a lack of measures, 131 
such as early warning systems, building codes and cyclone shelters, also play a role in 132 
shaping mobility. This means that categorizing ‘climate migrants’ as distinguishable from 133 
‘non-climate migrants’ is not empirically possible in most if not all circumstances. As a 134 
consequence, predictions of mass climate-induced migration are inherently flawed.12  135 
Second, the term migration does not capture the diverse ways in which people do or 136 
do not become mobile in response to a changing climate and should therefore be avoided. 137 
Some people may temporarily (even seasonally) move, while others may permanently 138 
relocate to nearby urban centers.11,13 Regardless, mobility commonly involves relatively short 139 
distances, meaning that people typically move within their country or region.11 Moreover, 140 
many may also face the problem of not being able to move to safety, while others do not want 141 
to move even if facing significant risk to their own wellbeing.11 To capture this diversity, 142 
research should shift its attention from ‘climate migration’ to ‘climate mobilities’. Such a 143 
program would capture the multiple forms, directions and multiplicities of human movement 144 





impact on places of origin, transit and destination.13,14 It would also focus on the movement 146 
of people in more neutral and therefore analytical terms - neither making assumptions that 147 
mobility is unidirectional or monocausal, nor inherently positive or negative.  148 
Third, new research supported by scientific funding programs, should examine and 149 
address ‘climate mobilities’ as the new normal rather than the exception. Movement and 150 
migration are inherent to the highly interconnected world we live in and a standard element 151 
of social life.15 As such, mobility will necessarily be part of the range of responses available 152 
to those affected by climate change.11 Instead of asking whether climate change causes 153 
human mobility, research should focus on whether and if so how climate change will alter 154 
existing interconnections and human mobility patterns under different scenarios of global 155 
warming and mitigation and adaptation policies, and how these are in turn shaped by existing 156 
mobilities. 157 
Fourth, it is crucial to fund and engage in research that goes beyond attempts to 158 
quantify and model new mobility resulting from climate change. Current climate migration 159 
models typically reinforce linear ‘crisis’ or ‘mass’-migration assumptions.16 The news media 160 
and policy alike tend to interpret the results of these models incorrectly. For example, they 161 
often refer to the maximum figures of a range as ‘predictions’, which in turn may be used to 162 
support the politics of border securitization. Policy instead should rely on research that better 163 
accounts for the non-linear complexity of mobility in the context of climate and social change 164 
in its evidence base.13  165 
Fifth, research needs to better include affected populations in ‘climate mobilities’ 166 
research. Multiple knowledge systems, such as local and indigenous knowledges, exist both 167 
among mobile populations and in destination areas, and should be included in building a 168 
stronger evidence-base. The solutions to the challenges posed by climate change – whether 169 





involvement of affected populations. With better funding opportunities, indigenous 171 
organisations representing populations involved in mobility associated with climate change 172 
can lead indigenous research, or participate in co-developed research. This is important if the 173 
complexity of ‘climate mobilities’ is to be captured, particularly its interconnectedness with 174 
related policy areas, such as indigenous rights and human development.  175 
Finally, research on ‘climate mobilities’ needs to shift part of its focus from climate 176 
sensitive sending areas to destination areas. Whether or not such mobility becomes a political 177 
or humanitarian problem depends on the policy choices by home, host and transit states and 178 
involved organisations, not on the mobility itself. As discussed in the introduction, global 179 
migration policy is defined by the strict border policies of popular migration receiving areas. 180 
These border policies in turn are shaped by an increasing fear of migrants among many 181 
citizens, such as in several European countries, USA, Brazil, Australia and elsewhere.18 In 182 
order to expand beyond the securitisation of climate-related mobility, research with support 183 
of funding agencies also needs to focus on how to overcome the profound fear of the other. 184 
This requires new and further collaborations across social science research into belonging, 185 
the acceptance of difference and identity, and important political, cultural and historical 186 
attributes of destination areas.  187 
  188 
Keeping the questions open 189 
Border securitization in current global, regional and national politics has infiltrated science 190 
policy. It is biasing public discourse and scientific and policy debates, despite the paucity of 191 
supporting evidence.19 To move beyond the securitization of climate-related migration, a new 192 





mobilities’ that prioritizes exploration rather than minimization of the complexity of the 194 
nexus between human mobility and climate change. 195 
A new research agenda requires funding agencies to change their focus away from a 196 
securitized outlook, allowing for a more nuanced science policy on ‘climate mobilities’ to 197 
emerge. A first step in this direction can be achieved, for example, through Human Migration 198 
and Global Change under the Belmont Forum fund, coordinated by Future Earth, which 199 
actively relies on academic feedback to help shape its funding priorities. The six ‘climate 200 
mobilities’ priorities also speak to Horizon 2020 successor programs, such as possible EU 201 
‘Mission-oriented Research and Innovation’ funding schemes, and other future, publicly 202 
funded programmes at the national level. 203 
Instead of having policy dictate the priorities of science, resulting in self-perpetuating false 204 
claims about climate-induced migration, the science policy process needs to allow careful and 205 
critical evidence-seeking research to indicate the main challenges ahead. In doing so, a 206 
‘climate mobilities’ research agenda can help ensure that policy addresses the right issues to 207 
start with. 208 
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